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1Chapter
Securing the Deployment of 
Cloud-Hosted Services for 
Guaranteeing Multitenancy 
Isolation
Laud Charles Ochei
Abstract
Multitenancy introduces significant error and security challenges in the cloud 
depending on the location of the functionality to be shared and the required 
degree of isolation between the tenants. Existing approaches for securing the 
deployment of cloud-hosted services to serve multiple users have paid little 
attention to evaluating the effect of the varying degrees of multitenancy isola-
tion on the security and access privilege of tenants (or components). In addition, 
approaches for securing the isolation of tenants (or components) are usually 
implemented at lower layers of the cloud stack and often apply to the entire system 
and not to individual tenants (or components). This study presents CLAMP 
(Cloud-based architectural approach for securing services through Multitenancy 
deployment Patterns) to securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services in 
a way that guarantees the required degree of isolation between the tenants. 
We evaluated the framework by applying it to a motivating cloud deployment 
problem. The findings show among other things that the framework can be used 
to select suitable deployment patterns, evaluate the effect of varying degrees of 
isolation on the cloud-hosted service, analyse the deployment requirements of 
cloud-hosted services and optimise the deployment of the cloud-hosted service to 
guarantee multitenancy isolation.
Keywords: security, cloud-hosted services, deployment, multitenancy, tenant 
isolation
1. Introduction
Applications on the cloud are accessed over the internet using standard internet 
protocols. In deciding to store data or host applications in the public cloud, an 
organisation loses its ability to access the servers that store its information. In this 
way, potentially sensitive data are at risk from insider attacks.
Therefore, cloud service providers must put in place security measures to 
physical access to the servers in the data center and frequently monitor data centers 
for suspicious activity. Security and privacy challenges deriving from the use of 
the internet are substantial and but no different from the security issues of the 
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applications not hosted in the cloud. The one significant security element intro-
duced by the cloud is multitenancy [1].
Multitenancy is an essential cloud computing property. Multitenancy is a soft-
ware architecture where one instance of a cloud offering is used to serve multiple 
tenants and/or components [2, 3]. Multitenancy means that your application is 
utilising a virtual machine on a physical computer that is hosting multiple virtual 
machines. There are many forms of attack utilising multitenancy- inadvertent 
data sharing, virtual machine escape, side channel attack, and denial of ser-
vice attack.
Users can require varying or different degrees of isolation between components 
when implementing multitenancy. To avoid interference, a high degree of insula-
tion between components may be required, but this usually results in high resource 
consumption and running costs per component. A low degree of isolation promotes 
sharing of components, resulting in low resource consumption and running costs, 
but with high performance impact when the workload changes and the application 
does not scale up/down.
The challenge therefore is how to: (i) ensure that there is isolation between 
multiple tenants accessing the service or components designed (or integrated) with 
the service; (ii) resolve the trade-offs between varying degrees of isolation between 
tenants or components.
Motivated by this problem, this study presents a framework, CLAMP (Cloud-
based architectural approach for securing services through Multitenancy deploy-
ment Patterns) to securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services in a way that 
guarantees the isolation between tenants. The framework assumes that the issues of 
security are tackled from the perspective of the tenant owns software components 
and is responsible for configuring them to design and deploy its own cloud-hosted 
application on a shared cloud platform whose provider does not have control over 
these components.
We evaluated the framework by applying it to a motivating cloud deployment 
problem that requires securing several components of a cloud-hosted service while 
guaranteeing the required degree of isolation between tenants. The research ques-
tion addressed in this study is: “How can we secure the deployment of cloud-hosted 
services in a way that guarantees isolation between tenants”.
The main contributions of this study are:
1. To develop a framework for securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services 
in a way that guarantees the isolation of tenants.
2. To evaluate the framework by applying it to a motivating cloud deployment 
problem.
3. To develop a cloud security checklist for guiding software architects in 
 implementing the framework.
4. Present recommendations and best practice guidelines for securing the 
 deployment of cloud-hosted services based on the framework.
Our findings show among other things that the framework can be used to select 
suitable deployment patterns, evaluate the effect of varying degrees of isolation on 
the cloud-hosted service, analyse the deployment requirements of cloud-hosted 
services and optimise the deployment of the cloud-hosted service to guarantee 
multitenancy isolation.
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an overview 
of cloud computing and cloud security. Section 3 presents architectures for 
cloud-hosted services. Section 4 presents multitenancy in a cloud environment. 
Section 5 discusses related work on multitenancy and cloud security. Section 6 
presents a framework for securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services for 
guaranteeing multitenant isolation, while Section 7 evaluates the framework 
by applying it to a motivating cloud deployment problem. Section 8 provides 
further discussion and recommendations for securing the deployment of cloud-
hosted services based on the framework. Section 9 concludes the chapters with 
future work.
2. Cloud computing security
This section gives an overview of cloud computing and cloud security and 
multitenancy.
2.1 Cloud computing
According to Armbrust et al. [4], “cloud computing refers to both the applica-
tions delivered as a service over the Internet and the hardware and systems software 
in the data centers that provides those.
services.”
The cloud includes hardware for the data centre as well as software. The cloud 
could either be a public cloud (that is, cloud that is provided to the general public in 
a prepaid manner), private cloud (that is, an organisation’s internal IT infrastructure 
which is not available to the public at large), or a hybrid cloud (that is, a private 
cloud’s computing capacity that is enhanced by the public cloud).
Although there are so many definitions that have been given for the term cloud 
computing, there is common agreement on the basic characteristics of a cloud 
computing environment. These include [3]—pay-per-use, elastic capacity and 
the illusion of infinite, self-service interface, and resources that are abstracted or 
virtualized.
There are three basic cloud service models:
i. Software as a Service (SaaS): In the SaaS model, cloud providers can install, 
operate and access their application software using a web browser. An 
example of a SaaS provider is Salesforce.com, which utilises the SaaS model 
to provide Customer Relationship Management (CRM) applications located 
on their server to customers. This eliminates the need for customers to run 
and install the application on their own computers.
ii. Platform as a Service (PaaS): In the PaaS model, cloud providers deliver 
cloud platforms which represent an environment for application develop-
ers to create and deploy their applications. A notable example of PaaS 
is the Google App Engine, which provides an environment for creating 
and deploying web-based applications written in specific programming 
languages.
iii. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): In the IaaS model, cloud providers offer 
physical (computers, storage) and virtualized computer resources. Examples 
of IaaS providers include: Amazon EC2, and Azure Services Platform.
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2.2 Cloud security
Cloud security relates to a wide range of policies, techniques, applications, 
and controls used to safeguard virtualized IP, information, apps, services, and 
related infrastructure. Cloud security is very essential for companies making 
the shift to the cloud and also for customers who use the cloud for a range of 
personal services especially as security threats continue to evolve and become 
more advanced. Cloud security concerns fall into two wide classifications: (i) 
security concerns faced by cloud providers (businesses providing software, 
platform, or infrastructure-as - a-service organisations through the cloud); 
(ii) security concerns faced by their customers (businesses or organisations 
that host applications or store data in the cloud). However, the responsibility is 
shared. There are four (4) main forms of attack that use multitenancy: inadver-
tent information sharing, virtual machine escape, side-channel attack, denial 
of service attack. The focus of this study is mostly related to inadvertent infor-
mation sharing where a tenant has a set of components/resources or services 
which are mapped to some physical resource on the cloud platform. Under this 
situation, data residing on the physical resource from one tenant may be leak to 
another tenant.
Cloud service suppliers often store more than one customer information on 
the same server in order to conserve resources (e.g., CPU, memory, storage space) 
reduce cost and maintain service level agreement. To handle such sensitive situa-
tions, cloud service providers usually put in place robust secure measures to ensure 
proper data isolation and logical storage segregation [5].
Cloud security is the protection of data, applications, and infrastructures 
involved in cloud computing. Cloud security concerns can be grouped in various 
ways. Gartner listed seven (7) categories of cloud security. In the “data segregation” 
category, which is the closest to the focus of our study, the cloud is typically in a 
shared environment alongside data from other customers [6]. The Cloud Security 
Alliance identified 12 areas of concern [7]. In “Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud 
Services” category, which is the closet to our study, the focus is on the use of poorly 
secured cloud service deployments, free cloud service trials and fraudulent account 
sign-ups via payment instrument fraud expose cloud computing models such as 
IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS to malicious attacks.
3. Architectures for cloud-hosted services
The architectures or cloud patterns used to deploy cloud-hosted services to 
the cloud are of great importance to software architects because they determine 
whether or not the system’s essential quality attributes (e.g., performance) will be 
exhibited [1, 8, 9].
3.1 Architectural patterns
Architectural and design patterns have long been used to provide known 
solutions to many common problems a distributed system face [1, 10]. A system/
application architecture decides whether or not it will show its necessary quality 
attributes (e.g., performance, availability, and security) [1, 8].
Definition 2.3: Architectural Pattern. Architectural patterns are compositions 
of architectural elements that provide bundled solutions to solve recurring prob-
lems a system faces [1].
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A cloud pattern in the cloud computing environment represents a well-defined 
format for explaining an appropriate solution to a cloud-related problem [11]. There 
are several cloud problems, such as: (i) selecting an appropriate cloud type for host-
ing applications; (ii) selecting a cloud service delivery approach; (iii) deploying a 
multi-tenant service in a way that ensures tenant isolation.
Cloud deployment architects are using cloud patterns as a reference guide 
to document best practice on how to plan, develop and deploy cloud-based 
applications.
Definition 2.4: Cloud Deployment Pattern. A “Cloud deployment pattern” is 
defined as a type of architectural pattern, which embodies decisions as to how ele-
ments of the cloud application will be assigned to the cloud environment where the 
application is executed.
Our definition of cloud deployment pattern is similar to the concept of design 
patterns [10], (architectural) deployment patterns [1], collaboration architectures 
[8], cloud computing patterns [11], cloud architecture patterns [12], and cloud 
design patterns [13].
One of a cloud deployment architect’s main duty is to assign cloud application 
elements to the hardware elements (e.g. processor, filesystems) and communica-
tion elements (e.g. protocols, message queues) in the cloud environment so that the 
necessary quality attributes can be achieved.
Figure 1 demonstrates how elements of Hudson (a typical of Global Software 
Development tool) are mapped to the elements of the cloud environment. Hudson 
operates on an Amazon EC2 instance while periodically extracts and stores the data 
it produces on separate cloud storage (e.g., Amazon S3).
4. Multitenancy in a cloud environment
Multitenancy is an essential cloud computing property where a single instance 
of a cloud offering is used to serve multiple tenants and/or components [14, 15]. 
One of the challenges of implementing multitenancy on the cloud is how to enable 
the required degree of isolation between multiple components of a cloud-hosted 
Figure 1. 
Mapping elements of a cloud-hosted service to the external environment.
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application (or tenants accessing a cloud-hosted application). We refer to this as 
multitenancy isolation.
Definition 1: Multitenancy isolation. The term “Multitenancy Isolation” refers 
to an approach to ensuring that one tenant’s performance, stored data volume, and 
access rights do not impact other tenants accessing the shared application compo-
nent or its functionality. Multitenancy isolation can be represented in three main 
cloud multitenancy patterns [11]:
1. Shared component: Tenants use the same instance of a resource and may not 
be aware that other tenants are using it.
2. Tenant-isolated component: Tenants share the same resource instance but are 
assured of their isolation. This pattern allows for the tenant-specific configura-
tion of the functionality or resource offered.
3. Dedicated component: Tenants do not share resource instance. That is, each 
tenant is associated with one instance (or a certain number of instances) of the 
resource.
4.1 Degrees of multitenancy isolation
The degree of isolation between tenants accessing a shared component of 
an application can be expressed in the three multitenancy patterns (i.e., shared 
component, tenant-isolated component and dedicated component). The shared 
component reflects the lowest degree of isolation between tenants whilst the highest 
is the dedicated component.
The three key areas where tenant isolation can be addressed in a system are: per-
formance, stored data volume and access privileges. For example, in performance 
isolation, other tenants should not be affected by the workload created by other ten-
ants. For example, other tenants should not be impacted by the workload generated 
by other tenants when considering performance isolation.
Guo et al. [16] evaluated different isolation capabilities related to authentication, 
information protection, faults, administration etc.
Different isolation capabilities related to faults, information protection, authen-
tication, administration, etc., have been evaluated by Guo et al. [16]. Bauer and 
Adams [17] have studied how to virtualization can be used to ensure that the failure 
of one tenant instance does not spread into other tenant instances.
A high degree of isolation can be achieved by deploying an application com-
ponent exclusively for one tenant. This would ensure that there is little or no 
performance interference between the components when workload changes. The 
deployment of an application component specifically for one tenant can achieve a 
high degree of insulation. This ensures that when workload changes, there is little or 
no performance impact between the components.
Nevertheless, since components are not shared (e.g. in a situation where some 
strict laws and regulations prohibit them from being shared), this means duplicat-
ing the components for each tenant, resulting in high resource consumption and 
running costs. In general, this would restrict the number of requests to access the 
components.
It may also be that a component requires a low degree of isolation, for example, 
to facilitate sharing of the functionality, data, and resources of the component. 
This would minimise resource consumption and running costs, but other 
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component’s performance might be affected if one of the components experiences 
a change in workload.
The challenge for a cloud deployment architect would therefore be how to 
overcome the trade-offs between the required performance, system resources and 
access privileges at different levels of an application when selecting one (or combi-
nations) of multitenancy patterns to deploy software tools in the cloud. Resolving 
the trade-off involving access privileges of users at different levels of an application 
depending on the type of multitenancy deployment pattern that is being used is one 
of the strategies for providing security for cloud-hosted services deployed based on 
multitenancy architecture.
4.2 Implementation of multitenancy isolation
Multitenancy isolation can be implemented both at the process levels (i.e., based 
on the processes that interacts with the system) and data levels (i.e., based data 
that is being generated or manipulated by the system) of a cloud-hosted service. 
Figure 2 shows an architecture that can be used to implement multitenancy isola-
tion at the data level. This implementation represents an application that logs each 
operation into a database by relying on an automated build verification and testing 
in response to a specific event such as detecting changes in a file.
A specific example of an implementation shown in Figure 2 is to use Hudson’s 
Files Found-Trigger plugin to poll one or more directories and start a build if there 
are certain files in those directories [18]. Hudson is an open source tool and so can 
be easily modified by adding a Java class that accepts a filename as argument into 
the plugin. The plugin is loaded into a separate class loader during execution, to 
avoid interfering with the core functionality of Hudson.
Definition 2: Application Component. This refers to an encapsulation of a 
functionality or resource that is shared between multiple tenants. A component of 
an application could be a data handling component (e.g. database), communication 
Figure 2. 
Multitenancy isolation architecture for cloud-hosted applications.
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component (e.g. message queue), user interface component (e.g. AJAX) or process-
ing component (e.g. load balancer).
There are several solutions to multitenancy implementation which have been 
widely discussed in the literature. Multitenancy can be introduced at different cloud 
stack layers: application layer [16], middleware layer [19], and data layer [20, 21].
It has been suggested that customization is the solution to addressing the 
hidden constraints on multitenancy such as complexities, security, scalability and 
flexibility [22]. Furthermore, integrating a plugin into a cloud-based service can 
provide a workaround for true multitenancy. Again, most of the solutions available 
to incorporate multitenancy require a re-engineering of the cloud service to some 
degree [17, 23].
Other research work on multitenancy isolation include: [24–30].
5. Related work on cloud security
Apart from the general research on best practices in securing the cloud against 
various forms of attacks, there is little research on approaches to secure cloud 
services against attacks arising from implementing multitenancy architectures. 
There is also little research on approaches for securing the deployment of cloud-
hosted services in a way that guarantees varying degrees of isolation between 
tenants.
According to Bass et al., one of the significant security challenges introduced in 
the cloud is multitenancy [1]. Implementing multitenancy means that your cloud-
hosted services are utilising the virtual machine on a physical machine that host 
multiple virtual machines. Much of literature on multitenancy and cloud security 
has established that the obvious approach to addressing the problem is for cloud 
providers to allow users to reserve entire virtual machines for their use. Although 
this defeats some of the economic benefits of using the cloud, it is nevertheless a 
mechanism to prevent multitenancy attacks [1–3].
Previous research has looked at this problem from the perspective of the cloud 
providers, for instance, autoscaling algorithms and supporting security-based 
strategies provided by IaaS providers such as Amazon and optimization frameworks 
suggested for use by SaaS providers such as Salesforce.com.
This study, however, looks at the issue from the tenant’s viewpoint, who owns 
software components and is responsible for configuring them to build and deploy 
their own cloud-hosted application on a shared cloud platform where the cloud 
provider has no control over the software components. The focus of this chapter is 
to provide a framework for securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services in a 
way that guarantees multitenancy isolation.
The work by [31] is one of the most detailed studies on cloud security. The 
author explores different aspects of security and the possible solutions that have 
been considered by different authors. The author did not consider approaches for 
securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services in a way that guarantees varying 
degrees of isolation between tenants.
6.  Framework for securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services for 
guaranteeing multitenant isolation
The section discusses the framework for securing the deployment of cloud-
hosted services for guaranteeing multitenant isolation.
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6.1 Developing the CLAMP framework
The study presents a robust framework, CLAMP, for securing the deployment 
of cloud-hosted services for guaranteeing multitenancy isolation. The framework, 
CLAMP (Cloud-based architectural approach for securing services through 
Multitenancy deployment Patterns), is basically a framework for guiding soft-
ware architects in securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services in a way that 
guarantees the required degree of isolation between other tenants when one of the 
tenants (or components) experiences a high workload or security breach.
The CLAMP framework is illustrated as a layered architecture in Figure 3. It 
shows how the components of the framework work together to support the task of 
securing the deployment of components of a cloud-hosted service for guarantee-
ing multitenancy isolation. The development of CLAMP was inspired by the well 
understood architectural structure/pattern called layered pattern [1]. A layer is an 
abstract “virtual machine” that provides a cohesive set services through a managed 
interface. In a strictly layered system, a layer can only use the services of the layer 
immediately below it. This structure is used to imbue a system with portability, the 
ability to change the underlying computing platform.
The different components of the CLAMP framework are described as follows.
6.1.1 Layer one: selection of a suitable architectural pattern
This layer addresses the selection of a suitable architectural pattern. In order 
to secure the deployment of cloud-hosted services for guaranteeing multitenancy 
isolation, it may be very difficult if not impossible to use one cloud pattern to 
deploy the service to the cloud due to the different requirements of the service 
including accessibility of the service to a wider audience and a combined assurance 
for security and privacy. For instance, the architect would require a combination of 
Figure 3. 
A layered architecture for securing the deployment of cloud-services for guaranteeing multitenancy isolation.
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several deployment patterns together with supporting technologies for archiving 
components of the cloud-hosted service (i.e., in a hybrid fashion) to integrate 
components located in a different cloud environment to form one cloud solution. 
Again, if communication is required internally to exchange messages between 
application components, then a message-oriented middleware technology would 
also be needed. Therefore, the challenge is that of selecting a suitable pattern 
(together with the supporting technologies) or a combination of patterns in order 
to secure the deployment of cloud-hosted services for guaranteeing multitenancy 
isolation. It is assumed that there is a repository of cloud deployment patterns from 
where a software architect can select a suitable pattern (s) to address the business 
requirements of the company/user.
6.1.2 Layer two: evaluation of the required degree of isolation between tenants
The layer addresses the evaluation of the required degree of isolation between 
tenants. There are varying degrees of isolation between tenants that are accessing a 
cloud-hosted service. Some of the tenants would require a higher or different degree 
of isolation than others. Tenants would be able to share application components 
as much as possible at the very basic degree of multitenancy, which translates into 
increases use of underlying resources.
At the very basic degree of multitenancy, tenants would be able to share applica-
tion components as much as possible which translates to increased utilisation of 
underlying resources. While some components of the application may benefit from 
a low degree of isolation between tenants, other components may require a higher 
degree of isolation because the component may be either too sensitive or cannot be 
shared as a result of certain corporate legislation and regulation.
There is increasing evidence, for example, that many cloud providers are 
reluctant to set up data centres in mainland Europe due to stricter legal require-
ments that prohibit data processing outside Europe [32, 33]. This requirement will 
traverse down to the IaaS level, and customers must take this into consideration 
if intending to host applications outsourced to such cloud providers [11] that 
host customers data outside Europe. Therefore, evaluating the required degree of 
isolation between the tenants will allow for the appropriate mapping of security 
requirements during the deployment of cloud-hosted services onto cloud pro-
vider’s infrastructure.
6.1.3  Layer three: analysis of the deployment requirements of the cloud-hosted 
service
Layer three addresses the analysis of the deployment requirements of the cloud-
hosted service. This involves two main activities: (i) mapping tenant isolation to 
key process of the cloud-hosted services, cloud resources required to support the 
service and layers of the cloud stack on the which the service will be executed; (ii) 
analysing the trade-offs that should be considered when implementing the required 
degree of tenant isolation.
The mapping is rooted in the framework of a typical architectural deployment 
system that has two main components: the cloud application (that is, the compo-
nent or service to be deployed) and the cloud environment (that is, the environ-
ment in which the process/service is performed) [1]. This mapping also captures 
the link between a process associated with a cloud-hosted service (e.g., continuous 
integration process), being used in a hybrid deployment scenario by utilising a 
cloud-hosted environment (e.g., SaaS and PaaS deployment environment).
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In our previous research, we provided an explanatory framework for (i) map-
ping tenant isolation to different software processes, cloud resources and applica-
tion stack layers (ii) illustrating the different trade-offs for consideration in order to 
achieve optimal deployment of components in a way that guarantees the required 
degree of tenant isolation [34] (see Figure 4).
Issues relating to security, privacy, trust and regulatory compliance can mostly 
be tackled in a hybrid fashion. For example, data / bugs created from a bug tracking 
system could be stored at some location to comply with privacy and legal regula-
tions, while the architecture of the bug tracking system could be changed to limit 
the access of certain data to users residing in regions not deemed to be of interest to 
those who own the hosted data. Securing cloud-hosted services deployed with the 
goal of guaranteeing varying degrees of multitenancy isolation can best be tackled 
using a hybrid approach.
The second aspect of the analysis involves analysing the key trade-offs for 
consideration when implementing the required degree of tenant isolation for 
cloud-hosted software processes. There are six key aspects of the trade-offs that 
have to be considered when implementing security for multi-tenant cloud-hosted 
software services. These trade-off include tenant isolation versus (resource shar-
ing, the number of users/requests, customizability, the size of generated data, the 
scope of control of the cloud application stack and business constraints). Table 1 
shows the trade-offs and the key decision that have to be main when considering the 
trade-offs.
6.1.4 Layer four: optimisation of the deployment of the cloud-hosted services
This layer deals with the optimization of the components of a cloud-hosted 
service. In a cloud environment, varying degrees of tenant isolation are possible, 
depending on the type of component being shared, the process supported by the 
component and the location of the component on the cloud application stack (i.e., 
application level, platform level, or infrastructure level).
In a cloud environment, depending on the type of component being shared, 
the processes enabled by the component, and the location of the component on 
the cloud application stack (i.e. application level, platform level, or network level), 
Figure 4. 
Mapping of degrees of tenant isolation to cloud-hosted services and resources.
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varying degrees of tenant isolation are possible. Therefore, it is important for soft-
ware architects to be able to able to control the required degree of isolation between 
tenants sharing components of a cloud-hosted application.
For instance, the deployment of an application component specifically for 
one tenant will achieve a high degree of isolation. This would make sure that 
when workload changes, there is little or no performance impact between the 
components.
However, because components are not shared it implies duplicating the compo-
nents for each tenant, which leads to high resource consumption and running cost. 
Overall, this will limit the number of requests allowed to access the components. 
A low degree of isolation would allow sharing of the component’s functionality, 
data and resources. This would reduce resource consumption and running cost, but 
the performance of other components may be affected when one of experiences a 
change in workload.
This is a decision-making challenge that requires an appropriate decision to be 
made to address the trade-off between a lower degree of isolation versus the pos-
sible influence that can occur between components or a high degree of isolation 
versus the difficulty of high resource usage and component running costs.
In a nutshell, the procedure for implementing the framework can be summaries 
with following four steps: (i) Select suitable deployment patterns (one or combina-
tion of several patterns), (ii) Evaluate the effect of varying degrees of isolation 
on the cloud-hosted service, (iii) Analyse the deployment requirements of cloud-
hosted services and (iv) optimise the deployment of the cloud-hosted service to 
guarantee multitenancy isolation.
6.2 Developing a security checklist for deployment of cloud-hosted services
In addition to the framework, CLAMP, we develop a security checklist to guide 
software architects in securing the deployment of cloud hosted services. The layers 
of the frameworks are used to develop the categories of the checklist. Many of 
the items in the checklist may seem obvious but the purpose of a checklist is help 
ensure the completeness of the security design while implementing the CLAMP 
framework.
In using the security checklist, the software architect should think about how to 
review the security of the cloud-hosted services and figure out how well it satisfies 
security in each of the categories of the framework. In other words, what questions 
Category Checklist
Selection of a suitable 
architectural pattern
What are classes of cloud patterns available, what are the tools and processes 
to support the selection of suitable cloud patterns.
Evaluation of the required 
degree of isolation 
between tenants
What are the data and processes of the cloud-hosted service that require 
security? What is the required degree of isolation between tenants accessing 
the components of the cloud-hosted services?
Analysis of the 
deployment requirements 
of the cloud-hosted
How can you map the key resources of the cloud-service (e.g., store for the 
archive data) to the cloud provider’s platform? What are the trade-offs to 
consider when securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services? (e.g., 
customizability, scope of control, business requirements)
Optimisation of the 
deployment of the cloud-
hosted services
What are the components (or tenants) that are required to design (or 
integrate) with the cloud-hosted services? How feasible is it to tag components 
or whole system?
Table 1. 
Security checklist for evaluating the framework.
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would you ask a software architect to evaluate how the framework satisfies the 
requirements for securing the deployment of cloud-hosted services for guarantee-
ing multitenancy isolation. This is the basis for the security checklist.
7.  Evaluation of framework for securing the deployment of cloud-hosted 
services
This section presents a simple case study of a cloud deployment problem to 
illustrate how to use the proposed framework to secure the deployment of a cloud-
hosted services in a way that guarantees multitenancy isolation. The following 
scenario explains our motivation.
7.1 Motivating scenario
Let us assume that there are multiple components of a cloud service (e.g., 
data-handling component) hosted on the same or different cloud infrastructure. 
These components which are of various types and sizes are required to design (or 
integrate with) a cloud-hosted service (e.g., continuous integration system such 
as Hudson or Jenkins) and their supporting processes for deployment to multiple 
tenants. Tenants, in this case, may be multiple users, departments of a company 
or different companies. The laws and regulations of the company make it liable to 
share and archive data generated from the component (e.g., builds of source code) 
and keep it accessible for auditing purposes. However, access to some components 
or some aspects of the archived data will be provided solely to particular groups of 
tenants for security reasons. The question is: in a resource-constrained environ-
ment, how can we secure the deployment of components of this cloud-hosted 
service in a way that guarantees the required degree of isolation between other 
tenants when one of the tenants (or components) experiences a high workload or 
security breach (Table 2).
7.2 Applying the CLAMP framework
This section explains how to apply the proposed framework, CLAMP, to secure 
the deployment of this cloud-hosted service in a way that guarantees the required 
degree of isolation between other tenants. Each component of the framework has 
Category Analysis
Selection of a suitable 
architectural pattern
The problem requires a hybrid-related deployment pattern, namely, 
integrating data stored in multiple clouds
Evaluation of the required 
degree of Isolation 
between tenants
The requirement to allow a particular group of users to access some 
components for security reasons means that the company requires the 
highest degree of isolation between tenants
Analysis of the 
deployment requirements 
of the cloud-hosted
Map the tenant isolation to key processes associated with the cloud-hosted 
service, cloud resources and layers of the cloud stack. Analyse the trade-offs 
required for optimal deployment
Optimisation of the 
deployment of the cloud-
hosted services
Tag each component. Analyse the trade-off involved, namely, achieving a 
high degree of isolation versus resource sharing. To address this trade-off, an 
optimization model is recommended to be used to select optimal components 
for deployment to the cloud
Table 2. 
Summary of how problem was analysed per layer of the framework.
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a part to play in securing the deployment of components of a cloud-hosted service. 
The structure of evaluating the framework, CLAMP, in its textual form, is specified 
as a string consisting of three sections-(i) Context; (ii) Problem; and (iii) Solution. 
In a more general sense, the string can be represented as: [CONTEXT; PROBLEM; 
SOLUTION]. Each layer of the framework maps to the step required to provide a 
solution to the cloud deployment problem. Table 2 summaries how the problem 
was evaluated based each layer of the framework.
7.2.1 Step one: selecting a suitable cloud deployment pattern
In order to address this challenge, this framework would recommend that the 
architect should reference some sort of a classification or taxonomy to guide in the 
selection of a suitable pattern together with the supporting technologies. In our 
previous work, we have developed a taxonomy and a process for guiding architect 
in selecting a suitable framework for cloud deployment [35]. In addition, a general 
process, CLIP (CLoud-based Identification process for deployment Patterns) has 
been developed for guiding architects in selecting applicable cloud deployment pat-
terns (together with the supporting technologies) using the taxonomy for deploy-
ing services/application to the cloud we also discussed.
It is important to note that the company does not have direct access to the cloud 
IaaS. Therefore, the architect must select a deployment pattern that can be imple-
mented at the application level to secure the deployment of the cloud-hosted services 
for guaranteeing multitenancy isolation. By making reference to the taxonomy of 
cloud-deployment patterns and the general process for selecting applicable deploy-
ment patterns based on the taxonomy, we would recommend that the architect should 
select a hybrid-related deployment pattern for addressing the requirements of the 
customer. It is assumed that the data archived by Hudson contains the source code and 
(possibly configuration files) that drives a critical function of an application used by 
the company.
The data stored by Hudson is presumed to contain the source code and (possibly 
configuration files) which drives a critical function of an application used by the 
company. Any unauthorised access to it may be devastating for the company. In 
this circumstance, the most appropriate multitenancy pattern to use is the hybrid 
backup deployment pattern. This pattern can be used to extract data to the cloud 
environment and archive it different cloud environments [11].
7.2.2 Step two: evaluating the varying degrees of isolation
This step involves evaluating the required degree of isolation between tenants 
and then select an appropriate multitenancy pattern or combination of patterns to 
support such a required degree of isolation. There are varying degrees of isolation 
between tenants that are accessing the cloud-hosted service and so some of the 
tenants would require a higher or different degree of isolation than others.
One of the key requirements of the company to provide access to some com-
ponents or some aspects of the archived data solely to particular groups of tenants 
for security reasons. Based on this key requirement, we conclude that the company 
requires the highest degree of isolation between tenants.
The varying degrees of multitenancy isolation can be captured in three main 
cloud deployment patterns: shared component, tenant-isolated component and 
dedicated component. The shared component represents the lowest degree of isola-
tion between tenants while the dedicated component represents the highest. In a 
dedicated component pattern, tenants do not share resources, though each tenant is 
associated with one instance or a certain number of instances of the resource.
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7.2.3  Step three: analysis of the deployment requirements of the cloud-hosted 
service
The step involves analysing the deploying requirements of the cloud-hosted ser-
vices. This analysis entails mapping tenant isolation to key processes associated with 
the cloud-hosted service, cloud resources required to support the service and layers 
of the cloud stack on the which the service will be executed. This analysis translates 
to using a hybrid approach to map the SaaS and PaaS level of the cloud provider 
to the cloud-hosted service which has a backup cloud storage. This type of cloud 
pattern is referred to as a hybrid backup pattern [3]. The archive data in a problem 
scenario can be stored in any location to comply with privacy and legal regulations 
of the company while the architecture of the cloud-hosted service could be modi-
fied to restrict exposure of certain data to users located in regions not considered to 
be of interest to the owners of the hosted data.
The second aspect of the analysis involves analysing the different trade-offs to be 
considered for optimal deployment of components with a guarantee of the required 
degree of tenant isolation. There are three main trade-offs that the company has to 
consider. The first trade-off relates to tenant isolation versus customizability. The 
higher the degree of isolation that is required, the easier it is to customise a cloud- 
hosted service to implement tenant isolation. However, because we assumed that the 
user has access to the application layer of the cloud stack, it would be more difficult 
to implement a higher degree of isolation at the application level in terms effort, time 
and skills set required to modify the source code. This raises issues of compatibility 
and interdependencies between the cloud-hosted services and required plugins and 
libraries. Each time a multitenant application or its deployment environment changes, 
then a tedious, complex and security maintenance process is also required.
The second trade-off relates to the “scope of control” of the cloud application 
stack. The architect has more flexibility to implement or support the implementation 
of the required degree of tenant isolation when there is greater “scope of control” of 
the cloud stack application. As the company requires a higher degree of isolation (e.g., 
based on the dedicated component), then the scope of control should extend beyond 
the higher level to the lower levels of the cloud stack (i.e., PaaS and IaaS) even as the 
cost of implementation of such a cloud security architecture will certainly increase.
The third trade-off relates to the trade-off between tenant isolation and business 
(or legal) requirements of the company. A key legal requirement of the company 
is that access to some components or some aspects of the archived data will be 
provided solely to particular groups of tenants for security reasons. The dedicated 
component which offers a high degree of isolation can be used to handle the legal 
requirements Such legal restriction, for example, legal restrictions and the location 
and configuration of the cloud infrastructure are usually difficult to compensate for 
at the application level. For example, a legal requirement can state that data that a 
specific cloud provider has hosted in Europe cannot be stored elsewhere (e.g., in the 
USA). Therefore an architect would have to map this form of requirement to a cloud 
infrastructure that specifically meets this requirement.
7.2.4 Step four: optimisation of the deployment of the cloud-hosted services
The key task in step four is to optimise the deployment of components of the 
cloud-hosted service. Some requirements cannot be fully satisfied and so there 
has to be some optimisation to ensure that the cloud deployment is carried out in 
way that does not compromise the security of the components of the cloud-hosted 
service. This entails tagging the components (or tenants) associated with the 
cloud-hosted service so that the software architects can be have more leverage to 
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implement the required degree of isolation between tenants. In [36] an implemen-
tation of the model-based algorithm was presented for providing optimal solutions 
for deploying components designed to use (or be integrated with) a cloud-hosted 
application in a way that guarantees multitenancy isolation (Figure 5).
7.3 Applying the security checklist
In addition to applying the framework on the motivating problem, we also 
apply the security checklist to support design and analysis of process for securing 
the deployment of cloud-hosted services for guaranteeing multitenancy isolation. 
Table 3 shows the result of the security checklist.
Category Checklist
Selection of a suitable 
architectural pattern
The hybrid patterns are a class of cloud pattern that can be explored. The hybrid 
backup pattern is suitable for the problem. Tools and technologies such as cloud 
storage, and REST, and message exchange technologies can be implemented
Evaluation of the 
required degree of 
isolation between 
tenants
The highest degree of isolation would be required for isolate tenants.
The data to secure include archive data- source code, configuration files. The key 
software process in this problem is the continuous integration process
Analysis of the 
Deployment 
requirements of the 
Cloud-hosted
The process supporting the cloud-hosted service (i.e., continuous integration) 
should be mapped to a cloud platform that allows data to be stored in multiple 
location without much restrictions. The key trade-offs in this problem are tenant 
isolation versus (customizability, scope of control, business requirements)
Optimisation of the 
deployment of the 
cloud-hosted services
The main components to optimise are—authorization/authentication data or 
database components, queue messages. The approach of tagging components can 
be done either manually or dynamically using a model/algorithm depending on 
the number of components and complexity of the processes involved
Table 3. 
Applying the security checklist.
Figure 5. 
Mapping a continuous integration system to cloud stack based on hybrid backup pattern.
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8. Discussions and recommendations
This section presents a general discussion of the key security issues that should 
be considered together with some recommendations that can be followed in order 
to secure the deployment of cloud-hosted services in a way that guarantees mult-
itenancy isolation.
8.1 Assurance for compliance with legislation and regulatory requirements
One of the challenges of implementing cloud security is to provide assurance 
to cloud users who need to demonstrate compliance with various legislation and 
regulatory requirements. Our proposed framework addresses this challenge by 
providing guidance to the software architecture based on the a taxonomy of cloud 
deployment patterns to not only to select a suitable cloud deployment pattern but 
to also evaluate the requirements of the customer to select a cloud multitenancy 
pattern that guarantees the required degree of isolation between tenants.
For example, there is growing evidence that many cloud providers are unwill-
ing to set data centres in mainland Europe because of tighter legal requirements 
that disallow the processing of data outside Europe (Hon & Millard 2017, Google 
2017). This requirement will traverse down to the IaaS level, and customers must 
take this into consideration if intending to host applications outsourced to such 
cloud providers [11]. The challenge, therefore, for a cloud deployment architect is 
that there are no case studies to understand and evaluate the effect of the required 
degree of isolation on the performance, systems resources and access privileges at 
different levels of a cloud-hosted service when opting for one (or combinations) of 
a particular degree of isolation between tenants.
8.2 Customizability of the cloud-hosted services and supporting process
Customising a cloud-hosted GSD tool (or any cloud-hosted service) can be very 
challenging if the service has several components that are being shared. A service 
deployed on the cloud can have many inter-dependencies on different levels of the 
application itself and with other applications, plugins, libraries, etc., deployed with 
other cloud providers. This could impact the security of the cloud-hosted system 
in a way that we did not anticipate and thus the degree of tenant isolation that was 
needed. There is also a serious risk that incompatible plugins and libraries will be 
used to alter, configure and run these GSD tools. This could corrupt the GSD tool 
and stop other supporting programs/processes from running. A simple way to 
tackle this infrastructure problem is to move tenant isolation deployment down the 
lower levels of the cloud stack, where the architect can deploy the GSD framework 
on a PaaS platform, for example. Middleware issues and methods for SaaS device 
customizability were discussed in [37, 38].
8.3 Errors and sensitivity to workload interference
Multitenancy may pose significant error and security challenges in the cloud, 
particularly when different degrees of isolation are introduced between multiple 
tenants who share resources. When resources are shared between multiple tenants 
in a multitenant cloud-service, it is very possible to affect the performance and 
resource usage of other tenants due to errors associated with one tenant (e.g. due to 
overload of the tenant or inadequate resource allocated to the tenant).
The type of error associated with a cloud-hosted service is a pointer to the 
key resources to consider in achieving the required degree of tenant isolation. 
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For example, moving the VM image instance associated with a cloud hosted service 
whose file permission had been set on a local machine to the cloud infrastructure 
could cause affect the requires degree of tenant isolation and hence the security of 
other tenants during cloud deployment. Therefore, it is necessary to get repository 
ownership and permission right before deploying such a cloud-hosted service.
8.4 Tagging components with the required degree of isolation
One of the challenges of securing the deployment of a cloud-hosted service is 
how to handle such cloud-hosted services that several interdependencies with other 
services elements to which it interacts. Therefore, it is important that components 
designed to be used or incorporated with a cloud-hosted service should be tagged as 
much as possible when the necessary degree of tenant isolation is needed.
Tagging can be a complex and complicated process and may not even be 
feasible under certain circumstances (e.g. where the component is incorporated 
into other systems and is not under customer control). Therefore, this can also be 
predicted in a dynamic way instead of labelling each part with an insulation value 
as necessary.
In our previous work [39], we built an algorithm that dynamically learns the fea-
tures of existing components in a repository and then uses this knowledge to associ-
ate each component with the appropriate degree of isolation. This information is 
critical to making key security decisions and optimising the resources consumed by 
the components, particularly in a dynamic or real-time environment.
9. Concluding remarks
The chapter presented CLAMP, a framework for securing the deployment of 
cloud-hosted services in a way that guarantees the isolation between tenants to 
contribute to the literature on multitenancy and cloud security. The framework is 
based on a layered architectural structure where the layers are allowed to use other 
layers in a strictly managed fashion; a layer is only allowed to use the layer immedi-
ately below.
The framework was evaluated by applying it to a motivating cloud deployment 
problem that requires securing several components of a cloud-hosted service while 
guaranteeing the required degree of isolation between tenants. The findings show 
among other things that the framework can be used to select suitable deployment 
patterns, evaluate the effect of varying degrees of isolation on the cloud-hosted 
service based on the requirements of the business, analyse the deployment require-
ments of cloud-hosted services and optimise the deployment of the cloud-hosted 
service to guarantee multitenancy isolation.
Future work would entail design an experimental procedure for automatically 
evaluating the framework (i.e., the layered-architectural structure) for secur-
ing the deployment of a real-life cloud-hosted service for guaranteeing isolation 
between tenants. Thereafter, this experimental design will incorporate into a 
simulator and testing tool for evaluating the layered-architecture for securing the 
cloud-hosted service for guaranteeing isolation between tenants. This approach 
has been discussed in [1] as a way to turn architectural parameters into constants, 
ranges and other that can be easily measured. This will allow software architects to 
determine the effect of each form of improvement or business requirements of the 
component or cloud-hosted service before deciding whether the service is secured 
enough to be deployed without compromising the required degree of isolation 
between tenants.
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